What the Quirinale Treaty means for Rome

At the end of November Italy and France signed the so-called Quirinale Treaty, designed to shield them from two threats they consider common to both: the risk of Germany returning to austerity, and Turkey's interference in Libya, the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. Rome and Paris intend to join forces to make Berlin keep the fiscal openness that is indispensable to saving their economies. And to check the advance of Ankara, which is capable of wearing down Italian and (especially) French influence in their near abroad. First floated at the beginning of 2018, the bilateral agreement gathered strength over the last year, up to its recent conclusion. The acceleration was driven by what happened during the pandemic. Forever searching for a narrative to save the eurozone (above all Italy), Berlin found in the virus a reason to present its spending on behalf of the eurozone's weaker countries as necessary. Hence the guarantee it gave the markets in recent months so that the European Commission could issue the bonds that underpin the so-called Next Generation EU.

Yet, for all its spirit of solidarity, German public opinion has no intention of acting indefinitely. On the contrary, as the September elections showed, it would like to stop soon the flow of money that also goes to our country. Their differences aside, the Italian and French economies could not survive the end of Next Generation EU, which the Federal Republic might well decide. So Rome and Paris have chosen to merge their weaknesses in order to harness the German giant, forcing it to commit to them in the future as well. In plain terms: Italy and France are convinced that this way they can better curb the appetite for austerity detectable in the new German government, embodied by the new finance minister, Christian Lindner.

The Quirinale Treaty was also drawn up with one eye on Turkey. Although in recent years it has been hit by France's own offensive in the Maghreb and the Sahel, Italy has decided that Paris is the lesser evil compared with Ankara. In practice, living under the Turkish heel in Tripolitania and threatened by neo-Ottoman penetration in the Balkans, the Italian government prefers to align itself with French positions rather than challenge Erdogan directly – at first the prime minister, Mario Draghi, had tried without success to trigger a reaction from the United States by calling the Turkish president a “dictator”. For some years Emmanuel Macron has seen Turkey as his main enemy, in the Mediterranean and in Africa as much as inside the Hexagon, where Ankara is accused of indoctrinating the radical imams who stir up the banlieues. Hence his pulling Rome towards him, in search of an ally with which to challenge the Anatolian power.

These are the main reasons behind the Quirinale Treaty, an almost obligatory pact for Italy, worried about being crushed between austerity and Turkey's boldness. With the risk of sliding further into France's industrial sphere of influence, already widely fed by the acquisition in recent years of Italian companies of strategic value. A potentially negative scenario, yet one considered acceptable in the absence of better alternatives.

Dario Fabbri

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